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THE SWAZI AND LAND PARTITION (1902-1910) 
by 
On the annexation of the Transvaal by Her 1,lajesty during the -10-Boer 
War (1899-1902), the affairs of Swaziland were put under the control of the Hi& 
Codssioner for South Africa, but in Thy l9Ol it was decided that Swaziland 
should be treated as a dependency of the Transvaal and correspondence relating 
to tlie territory was to be dealt with by the Secretary to the Transvaal 
Administration and, subsequently, from January 1902, by tne Secretary for irative 
Affairs. 
On the 25th June 1903 an Order in Council established that the rights 
and powers of the late South African ilepublic had, by ri&t of conquest, passed 
to His Ikjesty, and furtner that iXs Eiajesty (under and by virtue of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act 1890) had by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, suffrance and 
other lawful means, power and jurisdiction in Swaziland. The Governor of the 
Transvaal was granted all His I~lajesty's powers and jurisdiction within Swaziland. 
All revenues collected in respect of Swaziland were to be paid into the Transvaal 
Treasury and all expenditure incurred under the provisions of the Order in Council 
was to be paid out of the revenue of tne Transvaal. Also, under the provisions 
of the Svraziland Order in Council of June 1903, the Governor of the Transvaal 
Colony and the Transvaal Legislature reciprocally legislated for appeals from the 
S~raziland Courts to be heard by the Supreme Court of the Transvaal. Eventually, 
on 1st October 1904, Lord PElner, exercising tine powers conferred upon him by 
the Swaziland Order in Council of 25 June 1903, issued the Straziland Adminixtration 
Proclamation whereby, inter alia, the laws of the Transvaal were mutatis nutandis, 
and so far as applicable, declared in force in Swaziland and were to be 
administered as if that territory were a district of the Transvaal, and all duties 
inposed on public officials by the laws of the Transvaal were, for Swaziland, to 
be discharged by the officials dischazging similar duties for the Transvaal or by 
such officials as were specially appointed by the Governor. Swaziland, to all 
intents asid purposes, was well on tine way to incorporation by the Transvaal. 
IIo~,rever, that was not to be, for on 1st December 1906, by Order in Council, His 
Ibjesty lfdisannexedl' Swaziland from the Transvaal. Under the terms of this Order 
in Council the High Commissioner for South Africa was substituted for the Governor 
of the Transvaal wherever the latter had been mentioned in the Order in Council 
of 25th June 190 3, and certain sections of the 1903 Order with respect to revenue 
and expenditure were repealed; appeals to the Supreme Court of the Transvaal were 
abolished, the revenue and expenditure of the territory were no longer to be 
controlled by the Transvaal Colonial Treasurer, and, most important of all for 
the future, the administration of Swaziland was wholly divorced from that of the 
Transvaal, except that the Registrar of Deeds and the Surveyor General of the 
Transvaal Colony continued, as a temporary measure, to act in such capacities 
for Swaziland. 
It is from the Order in Council of December 1906 that Swaziland, for 
all practical purposes, became a British protected state whose legal and 
constitutional status vis-bvis the British Crown remained undefined and uncertain 
until the time of Swazi independence. The confused legal asld constitutional 
position did not, however, unduly worry the British Government, whose officials 
now addressed themselves to the real government of the country. The new 
administration was immediately confronted with the ni&immishly conflrsed and 
delicate subject of the concessionaires and their concessions and what they 
thaught should be done, and the Swazisl view of what should be done. 
"The history of the concessions of Swaziland", wmte Sir Eramis de 
Winton in February 1890, "is probably without a parsllel. There are many 
instances where native rulers have given large and important rights to individuals 
and to corporations, but in Swaziland the late King [Ebandzeni] and his Council 
have parted not only with all their actual territory but with rights which should 
only belong to the Government of a country, to a lot of adventurers whose sole 
object was to make money by them." (1) The concessions were of three kinds, 
namely: (a) trading concessions, and concessions not connected with the land - 
"These were of every variety of genuineness and of absurdity. One,for instance, 
was a concession to grant concessionsl" (2); (b) concessions connected with land - 
agricultural rights, grazing rights, water rights, wood rights, and mineral ri&ts; 
and (c) (this class consisted of one concession only) the Private Revenue 
Concession, originally granted in 1889 by King I"man&eni to one John Harrington 
in respect of all the King's private revenues. In return the Sw&zi King received 
a payment of £12,000 per annum, paid in monthly instalments. This concession 
(which was duly confirmed by the High Court of Swaziland - the Court which had 
inquired into the initial legal validity of concessions in 1890-1893) later 
passed into the hands of the Government of the South African Republic: that 
Government, because of its desire to control Swaziland in its efforts to gain 
access to the sea, had accordingly continued to pay the Swazi k h g  his £12,000 
per annum in monthly imtalments of £1,000, until the outbreak of the Boer War 
(1899-1902), when payments ceased. On 16th February 1905, however, by 
Proclamation No. 2, Inrd Ivlilner cancelled the Private Revenue Concession and 
decreed that all rents, royalties, and other revenues paid under it would 
thenceforth form part of the revenue of Swaziland. The cancellation of this 
concession subsequently formed the subject of endless correspondence and much 
bitterness between the Swazi and the Administration, and induced the Swazi to 
send a deputation to lhgland to protest against the sunrmary and arbitrary action 
of the High Commissioner. (3) 
To deal with the first class of concessions, i.e. the trading monopolies, 
was comparatively simple. Lord Milner resolved to expropriate them all, and he 
appointed a Co~rrmiasion - the Swaziland Concessions Commission, under the 
chairmanship of Johannes Smuts, ex-British Resident in Swaziland - to inquire 
thoroughly into the values of these concessions and to make recommendations on 
concessions which offended public morals and ought to be expropriated with or 
without due compensation. The money to expropriate these concessions was raised 
by a loan charged on the Swaziland Revenues. 
It was the second class of concessions - the concessions connected with 
land - which, in Lord Selborne's words, gave "infinite anxiety asad perplexityI1.(4) 
These concessions were the most numerous, covering practically the whole of 
Swaziland and overlapping in every direction. R. T. Coryndon, the Resident 
Commissioner for Swaziland, gave a true and graphic picture of the indescribable 
contusion when he wrote: "Practically the whole area of the country was covered 
two, three, or even four deep by concessions of all sizes, for different 
purposes, and for greatly varying periods. In but very few cases were even the 
boundaries defined; many of the amas had been subdivided and sold several 
times, and seldom were the boundaries of the superimposed areas even cote~ous. 
In addition to this, concessions were granted for all lands and minerals 
previously unallotted, or which, having been allotted, might lapse or become 
forfeited. Finally, it must be remembered that over these three or four strata 
of conflicting interests, boundaries, and periods there had to be preserved the 
natural rights of the Natives to live, move, cultivate, graze and hunt." (5) 
George Grey, the brother of Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary in the Liberal 
Government of 1906-1914, and the man appointed "Special Commissioner" to 
demarcate native reserves in Swaziland in pursuance of the policy of land 
partition,reinforced Coryndonfs picture of the confused tangle of the land 
situation in Swaziland. Of the thirty-six land concessions he dealt with and 
which had "defined" registered subdivisions,only two had had their surveyed 
plans filed in the Deeds Office in connection with the subdivisions, while "in 
every other case the subdivisions are defined by description. These 
descriptions are generally of a very vague nature; the boundaries are described 
in connection with unnamed spruits, hills, and rocks and dongas, and by native 
gardens and kraals which have long since been moved or ceaaed to existn. (6) 
Ilence the Special Commissioner had found it "quite impossible to recognise from 
the descriptions the boundaries of these sub-divisions" . (7) It is indeed hard 
to exaggerate, as the Resident Commissioner went on to sa,y in his annual report 
already cited above, "the complexity and chaos, or the difficulty of arriving at 
a solution which would preserve to the native his proper rights while securing 
to the concessionaire some equitable enjoyment of the privileges and rights he 
had purchased and which had been confirmed to him by responsible Courts". (8) 
It was imperative t:?at a solution be found to regulate this chaotic state of 
affairs, which was pregnant with danger should the Swazi quarrel with the 
concessionaires or the latter quarrel amongst themselves. The administration 
seized the opportunity to carry out land apportionment as the best solution of 
the whole problem. 
At the root of the problem was the conflict between two diametrically 
opposed systems of land ownership and usage. The hkopean concessionaires 
wanted to get freehold title to land they regarded as theirs by means of purchase 
from King I4lm.ndzeni, while the Swazi did not want to be disturbed in their 
occupation and ownership of the land which they ri&tly regarded as absolutely 
Swazi property - a possession which the European concessionaires had no right to 
tamper witn. The Swazi contention that they owned the land meant that each 
Swazi man had the right to move his kraal anywhere he chose, to graze his cattle 
WiyT~here, to take water from anywhere, to cut wood anywhere and to cultivate any 
patch of eound. The concessionaires, conveniently forgetting or simply ignoring 
the fact that the Swazi King had only granted them g~azing rights on a rental 
basis, now desired "to appropriate the best ground for themselves, to stop 
indiscriminate cultivation, m d  to displace any natives who are not required for 
their own purposestt. (9) This was the conflict the British Govementls 
representatives were determined to resolve. Sir Godfrey bgden, in his 
confidential memorandum already cited, declared: "... it is paramount that a 
modus vivendi be found which, while not giving them [i.e. the European 
concessionaires] political ascendancy, maintains their status as white men. If 
the natives on a land concession reject all reasonable proposals to compromise, 
the authority of Government should be fully exerted." (10) From these quotations 
it is evident that whatever solution was finally arrived at, it would be heavily 
weighted in favour of the European concessionaires despite the fact that m e n  
himself condemned the concessions as "iniquitousw and tfimmoral" comanercial dealings 
whose validation by an established Court (the joint Angle-Boer Swaziland Court 
of 1890-93) was "a lamentable sequelf1. (11) 
Lagden went on to suggest that there should be definite areas into 
which natives could move at pleasure or by order, the Swazi being given to 
understand that "the asswnption of direct control by His Majesty's Government 
does not give them the right to settle anywhere at will except on ground reserved 
into which white people are not admittedw. (12) At the same time the Swazi 
would also have it drilled into their heads that Itthe parental attitude of His 
Ilajesty(s Government in taking the country under active protection involves 
certain obligations, chief of which are implicit obedience to laws and lawful 
ordersn. (13) Should the Swazi complain about the difference in treatment 
between themselves and other Native Protectorates they would be told curtly that 
it was all due to their own past misdeeds, which had compromised both themselves 
and the Government in the matter of concessions; or, in Lord Selbornels 
picturesque language, the Swazi would be told bluntly "that they were reaping 
only what Umbandine had sown". (14) It was this apparent partisanship of the 
Swaziland Administration with the concessionaires which made Chief 5 1 a 1 ~ ,  a 
son of the late King Mbandzeni and uncle of Sobhwa 11, then the effective 
Regent of Swaziland, query whom exactly the Government had come to protect, the 
Swazi or the white concessionaires, and to declare, in the aftermath of the 
failure of the Swazi Deputation to England to protest against the partition: 
"We did not know we were killing ourselves by going under the British Government. 
Now we are in great trouble under the Government we have alwa~rs longed for." (15) 
Already, before he left South Africa, Lord Milner had addressed 
himself to the concessions problem and had appointed a Commission to go to 
Swaziland to divide the land concessions in such a aa to give the 
concessionaires absolute freehold ri&ts over a portion of their land concessions 
within which all native rights should cease. 1.lilner and his advisers thought 
that the result of leaving the land concessions untouched would be both disastrous 
to the natives ultimately and detrimental to the economic development of the 
country. (16) He foresaw tlie time when the cattle of the native and the cattle 
of tlie white man would be mixed up everywhere, giving rise to endless mutual 
accusations of cattle rustling; when the cattle of the native would eat the 
white mants crops; "when the native would go and pitch his kraal exactly on the 
spot which some white man had chosen for some agricultural experiment1', such as 
the growing of cotton, or,even worse still, when the native would build next door 
to the white man; when a white man would find a rich lead of tin in the @;round 
covered by a native kraal and commence to work it; when the native and the white 
man would be quarrelling about the sane scanty supply of water. All these 
considerations had led Milner to the conclusion that the only safety for the 
native was in the separation of white rights from native rights - in short, land 
apportionment would guarantee Swazi occupation and ownership of the land. 
lilnerfs land apportionment scheme was conceived on the principle that each 
Eumpean concessionaire should retain a part of his land over which the Swai 
would no longer have any ri&t at all; in return for this right of freehold and 
immunity from native interference he was to surrender part of his concession for 
the exclusive use of the natives. Iililner~s scheme was designed to cause as little 
disturbance as possible to the Swazi, as it made no provision to aggregate all the 
native areas into one large reserve or location. Altho* this aspect of tlie 
policy of partition might have been accepted by the Swazi, however, it 
stood condemned in the eyes of the concessionaires because it meant the 
establishment of "a great number of small reserves dotted about the countryn.(17) 
Milnerls Commission, whose members went to Swaziland at the time of 
Lord Selbornets arrival in South Africa to take up the duties of High Commissioner, 
"provoked much opposition both from the concessionaires and from the nativesW.(l8) 
The concessionaires denounced the partition policy as "a disagreeable operation", 
pointing out that the whole value of their concessions would be destroyed if on 
each concession were dotted about reserves for the Natives, and they strenuously 
urged that the policy of the consolidation of the native reserves should be 
carried much further than had been envisaged by Lord Milner and his Concessions 
Commission. (19) In fact, the white concessionaire community was split into two 
distinct groups: first, the owners of mining, commercial and industrial 
concessions (who were mainly of English origin or had connections with Ehgland) 
who came out in full support of the partition scheme; and, secondly, the owners 
of land concessions - the graziers and farmers (who were malFnly of Boer origin 
or whose sympathies 1~ with the ~ransvaal) - who were openly hostile. (20) The 
commercial and industrial concessionaires favoured land apportionment because 
they hoped that the consequent dislocation of native economic and social life and 
attendant lldetribalization" would mean a convenient and cheap labour supply. The 
graziers and farmers, on the other hand, feared the loss of their native labour 
and the profits they were making from "Kaffir famuin&' as absentee landlords, if 
the policy of land partition were followed to its logical conclueions. Thus the 
farmers' group, led by the Electors of the district of Ermelo in the Eastern 
Transvaal, sent a petition to Lord Selborne in which, inter alia, they stated 
their preference for the South African system of native locations, urging its 
adoption in Swaziland. These petitioners doubted whether it would be to the 
benefit of either the white or the native population of Swaziland to have 
"innumerable small locations of independent natives scattered throu&out the whole 
of the country, the inhabitants whereof are subject to no restrictions, and whose 
presence in such close proximity to the whites is feared as a very material 
dangert1. (21) T.Ioreover, the Petition went on, I1Petitioners, whilst acknowledging 
that in many cases concessionaires and natives cannot live amicably on the same 
ground, submit that in very many cases a partition between whites and natives is 
both unnecessary and not required; and submit that in such cases it is a hardship 
to both parties to be compelled to divide at neither's desireI1. (22) The 
genuineness or otherwise of the Ermelo Electors' concern not to cause hardship to 
the natives is a matter of individual opinion, but there can be little doubt 
that Breytenbach (the spokesman of the electors) and his fellow petitioners 
wanted the status quo to remain unchanged became they hoped that, ultimately, 
the natives would lose all their rights to land, which would then conveniently 
and without much fuss be appropriatEtlby the concessionaires. However, the 
petitioners' contention that the partition was both unnecessary and uncalled for, 
and irksome as far as the concessionaries and the Swazi were concerned, was, for 
completely different reasons, supported by Chief IYlalunge when he stated: 
"Government think they are stopping the whites and natives quarrelling, but we 
have been living with them all along without quarrelling.... We think the 
Govement should abide by the periods in the documents [i.e. the periods of the 
duration of the original grants, leases, etc.] as agreed between Mlandzeni and 
the original grantees and afterwards allow renewal where neces~ary.~~ (23) The 
Swazi hoped in this way to regain the land which Mbandzeni had allegedly 
foolishly alienated, as they expected the Government not to renew the majority of 
lapsed concessions. (24) Chief Mal- was in fact advocating the adoption of 
the policy of drift and letting sleeping political dogs lie. Both Lord Dlilner 
and his successor, Lord Selborne, had also toyed with the idea. Selborne 
wondered whether "after all, it might not be better to leave things exactly as 
they are, to let the concessionaires work out their concessions, which vary from 
15 to 100 years, without any attempt to divide the almost indivisible, that is 
the native rights from the concessionaires~ rights". (25) 
Certainly the policy of drift was attractive and simple, but in the 
li&t of other considerations of Imperial policy in South Africa, which weighed 
heavily with both Milner and Selborne, such a policy of apparent neglect would 
ultimately have been dangerously irresponsible. Although these considerations of 
imperial policy were,strictly speaking, extraneous to Swaziland, they vitally 
affected the future of Swaziland and were basically the factors that led the 
Imperial administration to adopt the policy and principle of land partition in 
Swaziland. The policy of land apportionment in Swaziland dovetailed neatly into 
Milnerts policy of "reconstruction" in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies 
in particular, and in all South Africa in general - a policy whose avowed 
objective was the ultimate establishment of British supremacy on a firm and 
permanent basis. For, in Milnerfs reasoning, British suprenacy could xmt be 
secure unless it sunk its roots deep into the soil of the South African veldt, 
and this political desideratum, in Milnerls view, could be achieved only by the 
policy of setfling loyal "Britishersgl on the land. Milner wanted to insure 
British supremacy against the grave danger of resembling a pyramid standing on 
its apex instead of on its base. Lord Milner expounded his views in a booklet 
entitled "The Settlement in South Africa - on the importance of attracting a 
Loyal Population to settle upon and to own the landq\ in which he argued that 
provided the mistakes of 1881 (at the time of the retrocession of the ~rsssvaal) 
were not repeated, Britain's role in reconstructing the administrations of the 
shattered Republics was not impossible as long as she did not create difficulties 
for herself "by weakness and vacillation and by attempting to conciliate by 
concessions, instead of mastering by tenacity and strength; combined with 
consistency and justice ... But however wisely these questions may be settled 
now, however well these Colonies may be governed in the future,it is the opinion 
of many well competent to judge, that unless the predominance of the Dutch in 
the population of the country districts and as the ownem of the land [and 
therefore] of the country, is largely modified if not destroyed the security of 
Englandls position in South Africa, and her trust and confidence in it as a 
loyal and reliable portion of the British Empire will be less than complete". (26) 
For, unless adequate measures were taken to attract settlers of the right sort 
to be "the foundation and the strength of permanent British rule in South Africa, 
then whatever fabric of Government may be reared, will be but built upon the 
sand". (27) Swaziland had a part to play, howbeit a small one, in this grand 
strategy of reconstruction and land settlement since it was designated as a 
"white man's country1g and not as a purely native territory like Basutoland or 
Bechmnaland. Both Milner and his successor, Selborne, thought that "the 
whites would increase in the country, as they certainly will; that the TransvaaJ. 
would obtain Responsible Government, as it surely will; that the clamour of the 
whites in Swasiland to be annexed to the Transvaal would be supported by the 
Government of the Transvaal; that H.M.G. would be unable to resist the pressure; 
and that Swaziland would be annexed to the Transvaal without any reserves having 
been established for the natives, and that in the long run the natives only would 
suffer from the non-separation of their riets from those of the concessiona.ires".(28) 
In the light of these considerations the British Administration felt that it was 
incumbent upon it to provide the Swazi with land, not because the Swazi were 
particularly deserving of such provision but because it was an essential part of 
the process of tidying up the tangled affairs of the country before it was 
finally handed over to the Transvaal, since the British Administration saw its 
presence in Swaziland as a temporary one only and was averse to establishing 
itself permanently as the ruler of Swaziland. (29) 
The essential provisions of the land patition as settled between Lord 
Selborne, the Hi& Commissioner, and R. T. Coryndon, the Resident Commlssioner, 
were contained in the Swaziland Concessions Petition Proclamation of 28 October 
1907. (30) The proclamation made provision for the recognition of mineral 
concessions in their entirety, provided that there was no unreasonable surface 
disturbance and provided that places of political and historical importance to 
the Swazi (e.g. graves of chiefs) were left alone. Holders of concessions the 
duration of which was for ninety-nine years or more were to have freehold titles 
issued to them in respect of the land not allotted for the exclusive use of the 
Swazi. According to Lord Selbornels calculations, out of one hundred and fifty- 
seven such land concessions, etc., thirty were for periods of thirty years or 
under. Many were for fifty years or fifty years renemble, ninety-nine years 
plus the right of renewal, and no less than fifty-two were in perpetuity. Each 
holder of any land concession - graaing, fanning, wood-cutting, etc., was 
required to surrender without compensation up to one-third of his concession. 
If more than one-third was taken (in consequence of the suitability of the land 
for native reserves) compensation would be paid, the cost falling on the 
concessionaires. If less than one-third were taken for the Swazi, the difference 
between the obligatory one-third and the amount actually taken would be sold. 
If a concessionaire was dissatisfied with what remained of his concession, the 
High Commissioner would exercise his absolute discretion and expropriate any 
such concession, the Administration meeting all the cost. Lastly, the 
Proclamation provided that the land for the Swazis should be "in every respect 
of a suitable character ... ample to provide not only for their present needs 
but for reasonable and natural expansion". (31) In the instructions to George 
Grey, the man chosen to perform the unpleasant task of demarcating the native 
reserves, the High Commissioner unfolded his plan as regards the native reserves. 
The Special Commissioner was enjoined to avoid "on the one hand, the evils of 
undue concentration, and, on the other, those of undue dissemination". (32) The 
Special Commissioner was to take special care to ensure that the land set apart 
for the exclusive use of the Swazi should not consist of "very numerous, small 
portions so dotted over the country as to be everywhere mixed up with the farme 
of white men. fa or if this happened] The opportunities of friction between the 
natives and whites would be multiplied; the value of the farms of the white men 
would be greatly diminished; [and] the natives would be largely deprived of 
that power of freely moving their kraals which they so much valuew. (33) In 
short, Special Commissioner Grey was to ensure that the land partition scheme 
did not defeat its object. Armed with these instructions Commissioner Grey 
proceeded to Swaziland at the end of 1907. 
The political situation in Swaziland was tense, and there was a great 
deal of excitement. Bunu, the Swszi King, had died in 1899, "a victim to the 
vices which the boundless wealth of the concession rentals enabled him to indulge 
to the full1'. (34) Sobhuza 11, his son and heir, was then a boy of about one 
year, and his gmndmother, Labotsibeni, a widow of King Mbandzeni, was the Regent 
with the respectful title of Ndhlovukati. Although. during the Regency the country 
was supposed to be under the rule of the Swazi Council, the Queen Regent and her 
son, Chief Malunge, were the effective rulers of Swaziland. By all accounts the 
Ween Regent was ''a woman of extraordinary diplomatio ability and strength of 
character1', who directed "an experienced and capable opp~sition~~ to the 
Administration which, for a time, the Government did not know how to deal with. (35) 
Even Lord Selborne grudgingly admitted the Queen Regent's ability when, in 
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of instituting a Swazi National 
Council @in the model of the Easutoland Council, he wrote, inter alia: "The 
Swazis are the most barbarous, the least advanced, the least intelligent and 
the least reasonable of all the natives living under the tribal system. 
Civilisation ha8 made practically no progress among them, and at the head of 
the tribe is the Chief Regent who differs from the tribe in being clever but 
whose moral standard is even lower than that of its average member. She is 
supposed to have magical powers in respect of making rain, and the Chiefs and l l 
people are in greater personal terror of her than are the Chiefs and people of 
any other tribe in South Africa of their Paramount Chief . .l1 (36) Although Lord I 
Selbornets picture of the Queen Regent as a political Moloch devouring all and l l 
sundry is indisputably false, it is all the same indicative of the power and l 
authority the Queen Regent wielded, not because she was a ruthless despot (as l 
Selborne thought) but because she was a politically intelligent and capable 
woman, as Coryndon realized. In discussing 'Ithe native characterw in his annual 
report, the Resident Commissioner noted that the Swazi had learnt the art or evil 
of political intrigue and diplomacy during the years when Swaziland was the happy 
hunting ground of the concessionaires and when the country was in the grip of 
an "orgy of bribery and lavish extrava@mcef'. (37) During these years of 
lfirresponsibilityll a wide section of the Swazi had come into contact with the 
white concession hunters and adventurers and it was hardly surprising that the 
general character of the Swazi should have become strongly affected by the 
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character and atmosphere which the white community had brought with it. "For 
several years the important Chiefs and the large and more intelligent population 
which a l w ~ s  urrounds the chief kraals were brought into contact with large 
numbers of adventurers and concession hunters . . . [most of whom were] men of the 
lowest character who employed bribery and all sorts of shameful deception 
without scruplet1 and had "allowed the ignorance and cupidity of the native to 
betray them into transactions of very doubtful character". (38) Thus it was 
not surprising, said Coryndon, that "the extraordinary education the Swazi had 
received during these impressionable years should hzve left some mark upon the 
national character". (39) One of tine major lessons the Swazi Chiefs,and the 
Queen Regent in particular, had received during the years of their 
"extraordinary education" was an "extraordinary capacity for intrigue and 
diplomacy". (40) After the termination of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the 
establishment of a full fledged 3ritish Administration, the Queen Regent had 
quickly ethered "all the threads [of Swazi politics] into her own hands" and 
since then "conducted with conspicuous ability an opposition to the Government 
so consistent and so strong that more than once actual trouble had been within 
reasonable distancel1.@1t is important to remember that the Queen Begent was no 
political upstart or novi~e to Swazi affairs. Her political education was not 
gained entirely t h o u  contact with the s e w  side of white civilization. She 
had taken a prominent part in Swazi affairs ever since the death of King lfiandzeni 
in October 1889 and during the minority of her son, the late King Bunu. It was 
largely owing to her influence and intransigence that the Swazi National Council 
refused to sign the Swaziland Convention of December 1893, and played a leading 
role in the sending of the first Swazi deputation to England in 1894 to protest 
against the imposition of Boer rule. ( ~ 2 )  Thus past experience of dealings with 
Europeans - freebooters as well as high-ranking Government officials from the 
Transvaal and the British High Comnissioner - combined with her natural intelligence 
made the Queen Regent a formidable political figure, for when she spoke she spoke 
with the voice and authority of one who knew both King Iaandzeni and King Bunu 
and was determined to safeguard the patrimony of her grandson, Sobhuza 11. The 
Queen Regent was helped in her work by her son, Chief Iffalunge, who was also a 
very intelligent and energetic young man, whom the Administration, without any 
tangible evidence, suspected of harbouring a burning ambition to usurp Sobhuzats 
throne.@The Swazi power nucleus was completed by the remarkable Vilakazi brotners - 
Josiah and Nehemiah - especially the former, who was the Regent's Secretary and 
had the difficult task of drawing up protests and petitions to the Administration 
and of conducting all the Regentts correspondence. Josiah Vilakazi was Swazi, 
born in Iiatal and educated at Edendale as a Tifesleyan Pkthodist. He was credited 
by Ihmick with being "very anti-white" and of fostering the suspicion with 
which the liegent regarded the Administration. And, what was even worse as far 
as the Administration was concerned, was the fact that "Both Josiah and Nehemiah 
speak and write English well, and they know the names of all prominent 
negmphilists in London who are likely to interest themselves in their businessll, 
ie.e the Swazist case against the concessionaires and the land partition. (44) 
It was these people who wielded effective power in Swaziland and who constituted 
what the Administration referred to as the "Zombode Party1'. Coryndon had his 
finger on the truth when he wrote in a confidential despatch to Lord Selborne on 
22 August 1907: "It has become increasingly clear & apparent to me that the 
three personalities whose influence is together of far greater weight than that 
of the remainder of tne Swazi clhiefs combined are the Ndl~lovukazi herself, I.lalunge, 
the uncle of the boy Sobhuza, and Josiah Vilakazi who is a Swazi by blood but who 
was born and educated in Natal.... These three have exercised for some years now 
almost complete control over Swazi native affairs, and their opinion represents 
the attitude of the nation.... It will not be till their almost complete power is 
broken that any really national feeling will find expression or that the 
Administration will be able to deal directly with the Swasi people." (45) 
Neanwhile, much as the Administration might deplore the Swazi political status quo, 
they had to deal with the "Zombode Party", for it was that llpartyll which gave 
expression to the wishes of the nation and the Administration would have been 
very unwise to attempt to rule by "diktat" in the face of the organized and well 
directed opposition of the "Zombode Partyt1. Hence the recourse to the use, 
wherever possible, of cajolery, diplomacy and compromise, occasionally spiced with 
firmness and the threat of abandoning the Swazi to their hated neighbours, the 
Boers of tne Transvaal. 
Thus the Administration was forced to pursue a policy of festina lente, 
and in 1906 the situation in Swaziland needed very careful handling if revolt 
were to be avoided. It was a time to act gently for, as w e n  mote, "The 
political Atmosphere has been heavily charged with unrest for some considerable 
time, and the Swazis have had the credit of being in a rebellious mood. iiany of 
our intelligence reports have indicated that they might give a lead to outbreak, 
and Swaziland is capable of becoming a storm centret1. (46) The situation was 
politically explosive and the Swazi had real and substantial grievances: the 
hut tax at g2 a hut was unbearably heavy (although this was later reduced to 
£1.10~. by Lord Selborne after his September 1906 visit to ~waziland) ; the Swazi 
had also suffered pievously from the Rhodesian redwater pest and had lost 
"almost all their cattle1', so that the bulk of the population who had depended 
on cattle sales to raise money found it "very hard to pay the Hut Taxn. (47) 
The harvests were bad and there were signs of famine throughout the land. 
Further, the Queen Regent and the Prince Regent, Malunge, and the great chiefs 
complained that, owing to the action of the Government officials, their authority 
was being undermined and their subjects no longer respected or obeyed them; and 
that this want of respect and obedience was being made an excuse for the actioas 
of which they complained, It vras "the old story of the wolf and the lamb". (48) 
blriting on 19 Ihrch 1906 to Fox-Bourne, Albert Bremer (after whom Bremersdorp 
was named, and who posed as a friend of the Swazi in competition with parsonson) 
stated in simple words the mvity of the situation: "Prospects in this country 
are very gloomy, Whites and Native complain very bitter [sic], the latter 
specially about their money due to them [under the Private Revenue Concession 
cancelled by Lord Milnercs Proclamation of 25 February 19051, and also about the 
land question, but first of all of the heavy taxes the Govt. demands and which 
the Nation cannot ?ay. The crops have been bad for years and this season promised 
to be a failure again, the greater part of their cattle they have lost through 
sickness and if the Queen &Nation see that the land is taken from them, that the 
Government has cancelled their Revenue Concession (by what right nobody knows) and 
the Queen will not receive any or only a poor subsidy, I do not know how it will 
end.... The wildest rumours are afloat, and even the Officials admit that the 
present situation is gzave. . . . " (49) Here, indeed, was a good recipe for colonial 
revolt, for here were ingredients of discontent similar to those which had led\to the 
Shona and Ndebele rebellions in S. Rhodesia in 1896-97, or, nearer home, to the 
ill-fated Barnbatharising in Zululand and Natal in 1906. Not unnaturally, wild 
rumours of revolt circulated the country "and it is not improbable that the more 
far-seeing of the Chiefs recognised this as probably the last opportunity which 
they would have of organising an effective bid for independence". (50) Unfounded 
stories were told of a planned ~ n e r a l  native rising master-minded by that luckless 
descendant of Cetshwayo, Dinizulu, who was reported to have sent messengers to the 
Chiefs Iigwanasa of Tongaland, Khama of the Ngwato, Linchwe at Mochudi, to the 
Paramount Chief of Basutoland, and to the Swazi Queen Regent soliciting their 
active co-operation in a massive black revolt; and the Swazi were reported to 
have signified their willingness to join such an uprising. (51) These wild and 
unsubstantiated rumours were,as one official at the Colonial Office minuted, 
"a canard"; they are, all the same, a good indication of the restlessness that 
was prevalent amongst the Swazi. 
The Swazi were quite alive to the danger posed by the Concessions 
Partition Proclamations of both Lord PElner and Lord Selborne, viz. that their 
very existence as a nation hung in the balance,& the tribe feared being "turned 
into a congeriaof small crowded locations which in process of time will become 
too small and will become hot beds of misery and disease". (52) The leaders of 
the nation were determined to prevent this danger. Ever since the issue of Lord 
ZfIilner's Swaziland Administration Proclamation No. 3 of 1904 the Swazi had 
protested against the proposal to divide up their country, arguing throughout 
that King Kbandzeni did not sell the Land but only lent it to the white 
concessionaires and g~azierswho were now claiming freehold title to land they had 
never bought. Etnotions ran high, and Chief Pklunge at one time demanded from the 
High Commissioner a strict definition of the words "buy1' and "lend", "leasen and 
"sale", adding: "Mbandini asked for rent for grazing and minerals and that is 
not? taken as selling land. I do not think that anywhere if a man leases a farm 
he takes it for his own. While I was in England I was living in a house which 
belonged to a white man and was paying rent. If I had remained in Eng1a;nd would 
it have become mine? Would the Government come to me and say I had been paying 
rent and had better take it? All we can say is that our land is being taken from 
us without reason." (53) And for full measure the Queen Regent added: 
"Government simply says to the Concessionaires: 'You are right.' ... What I think 
is being done is that my people are being taken away too.... You are tearing my 
skirt ... If Mbandini sold land, where did he think his children were going to 
live?" (54) The Administration had no very convincing answer to these 
challenging questions, except to blame Mbandzeni's improvidence a;nd to reject 
the Swazis' demands that all concessions "should be cancelled and annulled in all 
cases where the concessions depended on a yearly or other rental and which rental 
has not been paidt1. (55) Lord Selborne, in an address to a Deputation of Swazi 
Chiefs sent down to Cape Town to congratulate him on his appointment as Hi& 
Commissioner, told the Swazi that their wishes would not be granted, and that the 
Swazi had no right to say they were not @;etting justice as they were only reaping 
the fruits of Mbandzenifs recklessness in granting concessions. (56) Lord 
Selborne also stated, among other things, that the Swazi were British subjects. 
This was a point which the Swazi strenuously objected to, contending that their 
"independence" was and had always been guaranteed by the various conventions 
between Great Britain and the late South African Republic, and that althou 
they were under the protection of the late Republic they were not annexed to it; 
that although the British Government had succeeded to the position of the late 
Transvaal Government, the position was not altered, and the rights which the 
Transvaal Government exercised in Swaziland, and only these, could legally be 
exercised by the British Government. (57) They claimed, furthermore, that being 
"allies" of the British Government, and unaffected by the late wax (1899-1902), 
it was unjust and unlawful to treat them as if they were a people whose territory 
belonged to the Boers, and as such to be treated similarly to the Natives of the 
Transvaal, who passed by right of conquest of the Transvaal into the possession 
of the British Government. (58) The Swazi protest raised the grave issue of the 
confused legal and constitutional status of Swaziland vis vis Great Britain: 
Was the British Crown the ultimus haeres in Swaziland or not? The Colonial 
Office conveniently ignored the complex theoretical issues involved in 
discussing sovereignty in Swaziland by stating bluntly that the Swazi, by the 
Convention of 1894, had parted with their cherished "independence", and that, 
altho* His Ihjesty's Government had never annexed Swaziland, the Protectorate 
status of the country was "of the type which approaches indefinitely near to 
annexation and the Swazi nust be held to have abandoned their unoccupied lands 
to the Crown in a similar, thot not precisely identical fashion to Khama, Sebele 
& l3athoenl1. (59) The Swazist argument was theoretically tenable but practically 
impossible, and the British Administration, with more sense of realism than 
respect for the niceties of theoretical constitutional practice, decided to 
ignore the Swazi contention. The Swazi, however, were unimpressed and, getting 
no justice from the High Commissioner and the Resident Commissioner, they decided 
to appeal to London. 
On the 2nd of 14ay 1907, at a meeting held at Mbabane, the Swazi men 
of power made known to the Resident Commissioner their wishes to send a deputation 
to England, and demanded that the Commissioner "give them the roadf1. The initial 
response of the Administration to this request was one of outright refusal. 
From the governmentts point of view, to yield to the Swazist request for a 
deputation to England was to set a bad administrative precedent, as t'nere was no 
lmoving that in future the Swazi would not demand deputations to Fkgland on any 
issues they disliked. This would ultimately undermine the rule and authority of 
the High Commissioner and his subordinates in Straziland. (60) The Ei& 
Commissioner therefore strongly urged the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
send him "a really stiff reply", wl.ifch would be communicated to the Swazi Regent 
and Council as the direct message of the Secretary of State and the lZng,to the 
effect that the decision to partition the land was the King's and that he (the 
~ing) was "surprised and displeased that the Chief Regent should question that 
fact ... that the decision is irrevocable and that there is not the least use in 
her thinking that a deputation to London could have any effect in repealing or 
modifying it". (61) The Colonial Office stood full square behind Lord Selborne 
in his firm stand, basing their reply to Selborne on 16 May 1907 on H. Lucasls 
minute on SelborneIs telegraphic despatch of 13 May: "I think we must back up 
Lord Selborne strongly. I dare SW you [H. W. ~ust?] remember the Swazis in 
195 & their terrible circulus in loquendo. But above all to allow deputations 
like this is to strike at the root of all stable administration." (62) 
Lord Elgin's "really stiff reply" (as desired by Lord ~elborne) was 
cormu.nicated to the Swazi at a meeting held at Zombode Royal &aal on Ionday, 
3 June 1907. The Swazi were, however, undaunted by the reply, whose only effect 
was to make them even more determined to send a deputation to -land. The 
Swazi leaders wanted to know why the High Commissioner was so unwilling to take 
them to the King. Surely, they argued, if the administration had nothing to hide 
from their superiors they should "give them the road". The Swazi began to suspect 
that the local officials were refusing them permission to go because they were 
afraid of being told off by their superiors in London who, the Swazi believed, 
knew the Swazi had a just cause and wanted to do them justice but were being 
deliberately misled and thwarted by the obstructionist tactics of the High 
Commissioner and his local officials, especially the Reeident Commissioner, whon 
the Swazi had nick-named Msindazwe (the man who weighs the earth down, i.e. the 
oppressor). (63) The administration quickly realized that they were being 
panoeuvred into an unpleasant position. Reporting on the meeting of 3 June 1907 
to the High Commissioner, the Resident Commissioner, Msindazwe, admitted as much 
when he wrote: "There is no doubt that the Swazi Chiefs have come to attach some 
considerable importance to a deputation to England, and thou& I do not think that 
either the Chiefs or the bulk of the people are much interested in the matter ... 
I conclude that many of the Chiefs have been for a long time so impressed by 
interested advisers as to the advantages to be derived from an embassy to England, 
that should such a visit be prohibited indefinitely, they will be inclined not 
only to magnify the loss of the probably somewhat vague benefit they hope to 
secure, but will feel aggrieved at the restriction in their case of a privilege 
which has been enjoyed within recent years by the smaller Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Chiefs, by the Matabele, Khama, LevJanika, and lately by what was popularly supposed 
to be a Basuto deputation." (64) The Resident Comissioner~s resolve began to 
waver and he counselled his superior, Lord Selborne, that "it may be politic while 
definitely refusing pemission for a deputation on this matter [i.e. the Private 
Ilevenue Concession and the land partition] which is now disturbing a small but 
powerful minority of the nation, to hold out some indication that in the not 
distant future the Government might be prepared, when convinced that the nation 
had satisfactorily accepted the position brought about by the recent change in 
their political control, to consider the matter favourably". (65) The Resident 
Commissioner also expressed in very strong terns his dislike of the Regent and her 
advisers: "A more intimate acquaintance with affairs in Swaziland", he wrote, 
"has led me to believe that so long as the almost entire control of their own 
affairs continues to rest in the hands of the Ndhlovukazi, the present Chief Regent, 
so long will the most responsible and experienced Chiefs of the Nation be debarred 
from the exercise of that moderate and conservative policy to which I believe they 
lean, and so long will the nation be subject to the whims and intrigues of an 
autocrat who has not only shown herself to be intemperately selfish and ambitious, 
but who has frequently exhibited a dangerous credulity for the advice of 
irresponsible and I am afraid at times unscrupulous adventurers - both white and 
black." (66) 
Ironically enough, it was these very disagreeable traits in the Swazi 
character as enumerated by Resident Commissioner Msindazwe which forced him and 
his dhief to yield their ground ultimately. Lord Selborne did a complete 
somersault and cane "reluctantly to admit that a Swazi deputation to England 
seems inevitable and that the wisest course to take is to get the evil over 
quickly and to draw as much advantage from it as possiblett. (67) The High 
Commissioner in fact went even further than the Resident Commissioner was 
prepared to go, for, whereas the Resident Commissioner had proposed that 
permission to go to Ehgland should be given only after the decision about land 
partition had been announced and only if the Swazi showed a determination 
forcibly to resist partition, the High Commissioner decided that it was 
politically advantageous that permission to send a deputation to London should be 
granted before and not after the decision about land partition had been announced. 
"The knowledge that the deputation is going to London", he argued, "will act as 
a safety valve when the decision about land partition is received". (68) 
Further, a collateral advantage to the Administration in giving the Swazi 
permission beforehand to send a deputation to England "about nothing in 
particular" would exist in the fact that the Administration would avoid the 
necessity of allowing the Swazi to send a deputation with special reference to 
the land partition which in their eyes would, if permitted, "certainly wear the 
aspect of a special visit of appeal" from the decision of the High Commissioner - 
a possibility which would not make for stable government. (69) Lord Selborne 
had, in fact, resigned himself to the fact that both himself and the Resident 
Commissioner had failed to shake the Swazi resolve to go to England. iie 
therefore did as much as any man in his position of power could do to minimize 
and to undermine the Swazfs' victory, informing the Secretary of State, 
unconvincingly, that he was only allowing the deputation on the strict 
understanding that the Swazi envoys would not discuss the sore subject of the 
Private Revenue Concession Itor of the land settlement or of any other specific 
grievance", but would only come to pay their respects fo the King and the 
Secretary of State, "as other native tribes have done in recent years". (70) 
On receipt of Selbornels despatch of 17 June 1907 the Colonial Office 
was very disappointed that the High Commissioner had given way. Sir Francis 
~opwood (later Lord ~outhborougb), the Permanent Under Secretary for the Colonies 
(1907-1911), minuted on the despatch: "I think it a pity that Lord Selborne should 
have weakened in his opinion against any deputation. How can we secure that a 
deputation shall be only complimentary? When it arrives every grievance will be 
put in evidence . . . l1  (71) H. W. Just minuted on the same despatch that if a 
deputation was inevitable, then it had better come during the Parliamentary 
winter recess, adding: "E?ut Lord Elgin will, I presume, wish in the first place 
to represent to Lord Selborne the extreme desirability of avoiding a deputation, 
if at all possible, to see whether he cannot even now invent some means of doing 
so." (72) El& himself was convinced that there would be "troublew if the 
deputation was allowed. He found the arrangement that, if the worst came to pass 
and the coming of the deputation becane the lesser of two evils, the deputation 
should come during the winter recess "a very meagre protection" in view of the 
fact that "The Press in the big gooseberry season will welcome a Queen from 
~o[uth] Africa - or even a deputation. And there are a l w ~ s  M.Ps. on the 
warpath" (73) - not to mention the Aborigines Protection Society and the 
negrophilists. He concurred with the views of his subordinates t m t  since it 
would be impossible for the Colonial Office the prevent the Swazi from raising 
the questions to which the High Commissioner objected, i.e. the Private Revenue 
Concession, Land Partition, and appeals from the Queen Regent's Court to the 
Resident Commissioner~s Court, Lord Selborne should use his powers to stop tle 
deputation from coming to &gland. This was accordingly done on 14 August 1907.(74) 
In a telegraphic despatch in answer to the Colonial Office telegram of 
14 August 1907, Lord Selborne stated that it was only "with great reluctance but 
after full consideration" that he had come to the conclusion that the Swazi 
deputation should be allowed. The H i &  Commissioner, in fact, admitted that he 
had failed to "invent some means" of stopping the Swazi, as the Colonial Office 
would have liked. The Swazi, he said, were fully determined to send the 
deputation and were most persistent in the matter; they had again, on 2 August 
and in writing, formally requested leave to go. "They can only be prevented from 
going by force", he continued, "and I ask myself can you authorize me to prevent 
them by force or if you did so authorize me would you be able to persist in your 
authorization." (75) This clinched the matter. The Colonial Office was loth to 
sanction the use of force to prevent the Swazi from sending their deputation to 
England, although such a measure could possibly have been carried successfully 
into effect since there were still Imperial troops in South Africa. But in the 
aftermath of the native disturbances in Natal and Zululand (1906) the possibility 
of yet another native war was too serious to be toyed with. And so, under these 
circumstances, the Colonial Office acquiesced in Selbornefs view that it was 
politically wise that permission should be given the Swazi to go under the 
control of the Administration at a time which suited the administration best, 
rather than that they should go independently and "attached to some private white 
agent like Bremer and at any time chosen by them". (76) All that the High 
Commissioner wanted now was to arrange matters in such a way as "to derive as 
much advantage and as little disadvantage from visit as possible". (77) Lord 
Selborne admitted that he quite realized the impossibility of preventing the 
Swazi from raising grievances when in England, but he proposed to impress on 
them that "however much they may talk there is not the slightest chance of H.M.G. 
reconsidering decision on any point. I would tell them that if object of 
deputation is to secure reconsideration of any decision they might as well stay 
at home ..." since the Secretary of State would only give them the same replies 
as those given them by the High Commissioner himself and the Resident 
Commissioner. (78) 
The Swazi leaders, however, refused to believe that their deputation 
would only be a ceremonial visit. At a meeting held at Mbabane on 11 October 
1907, Prince PIalunge said that it was absurd for the Administration to maintain 
such a proposition for it was known that "when a deputation is sent ... it is 
going on a [political] missionf1, and, in any case, it was superfluous to say that 
the deputation would be going to pay homage to the K i n g ,  because the Swazi had 
already done so in 1894. (79) As far as they were concerned, the deputation 
was of great national and political importance since they firmly believed, as 
IIarwick commented unsympathetically, "that all the legislation and administration 
of Swaziland had not the support of the Home Government, and they imagined that 
it was only necessary for them to say a few words to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies to cause a wholesale change". (80) The High Commissioner and his 
aides therefore did all they could to make sure the Swazi deputation would achieve 
nothing tangible in London. Such certain failure of the deputation would be 
"not only a wholesome lesson to them but a severe blow to the influence of the 
Regent which influence is at present the cause of most of our administrative 
difficulties". (81) Lord Selborne further speculated that the people would blame 
the failure of the deputation on the Queen Regent, who had proposed it; the 
Regent would thus lose a considerable part of her influence with the tribe "with 
the result that our administrative difficulties will be correspondingly decreased 
and the prestige of the Government enhanced". (82) 
In the event the Swazi deputation, thanks to Selbornels successful 
efforts to sabotage it, did prove a failure as regards the Swazi demands that the 
Private lievenue Concession be restored and that the policy of land partition be 
reversed. While the deputation was away in England on their unsuccessful mission, 
Special Commissioner George Grey proceeded with his task of partitioning t'ne land. 
The Commissioner soon found that he was a very unwelcome guest as far as the 
natives were concerned. The Queen Regent and the Chiefs made their stand clear: 
they would not lend a willing hand to the work of dispossessing (or, in their view, 
the robbing of) Sobhuza (and ultimately the Nation itself) of his patrimony. As 
Chief Malunge said in a clear and lucid but emotionally charged speech: "We 
know the Partition Commissioner is at work but we have not agreed to it and we a m  
not satisfied. It is Government work and we are not in it ... We only think it 
ic be in^ done because we are a different race. The land is ours. (83)  The 
Special Commissioner and the Administration were undeterred by these protests. 
The Commissioner published his report on 29 December 1908. His task had taken him 
exactly twelve months to the date to complete. Grey's partition made provision 
for thirty-two Native areas. The actual mount of land allotted to the Swazi 
was 2420 square miles out of a total area of Swaziland of 6553 square miles - 
just a little more than a third. Grey himself was confident that he had done 
his work well and claimed that in demarcating the native reserves he had 
"necessarily selected the most fertile portions1', excluding the most rocky and 
barren portions. The Commissioner took comfort in the fact that although the 
Swazi had got roughly about one-third of the surface area of Swaziland, yet, if 
the whole of Swaziland could be valued from its capacity to produce food and 
support human life, it would be found that "the value of the portions awarded to 
the Swazis as native area would be greater in value than the remainder of the 
countryv. (84) 
The partition ma.y certainly have given the Swazi the most fertile and 
most valuable land, as the Special Commissioner and the Administration claimed, 
but that advantage lost its importance because of the over crow^ and oveB 
stocking (and the soil erosion) consequent on the removal of the Africans -fTom 
private land onto the reserves. 14oreover, this advatas was practically 
meaningless to people who did not base their evaluation of the worth of any land 
on what test-tube chemical anaZysis might prove was its potential productivity 
and profitability, but on its vastness in extent. It was hoping for the 
impossible for the Administration to expect the Swazi to accept the partition in 
its entirety: the injustice of the land partition was patent to them in the 
ratios of the area they got (1/3) compared to that reserved for the European 
concessionaires and the Crown (2/3) - the greater portion of the latter ratio 
being empty land from which the Swazi were to be physically removed between 1909 
and 1914, in the process of clearing the land for white settlement and the 
incorporation of Swaziland in the Transvaal, since Swaziland was destined to 
become a white man's country and not another Basutoland. (85) There can be no 
doubt that the future settlement and colonization of Swaziland by a thriving 
vrhite community whose ultimate political and economic interests would lie in the 
coming llUnion of South Africa" constituted the real basic factor that led to the 
policy of land partition, and not the protection of native rights to land, although 
this was a very important variation on the major theme of founding a white colony 
in Swaziland. The "protection of native rights to landn argument was used as a 
sop to silence the disturbed consciences of the people in the Aborigines Protection 
Society and all the liberal-sentimentalists and humanitarians in England. It was 
practical and successful politics to use the humanitarians' own language to 
disguise the obvious political and economic reality that the Swazi had received 
less than a square deal in the land partition. And Lord Selborne was adept at 
this game of  success^ pretence, employing some very striking language to 
justify land apportionment. Thus, when addressing the Swazi on the subject on 
14 IvIay 1909, the Hi& Colmnlssioner, in self-justification, stated that the land 
of Swaziland was like "a fair maiden whom Umbandine had married to two men" and 
that, in his opinion, such a state of affairs was fraught with pave danger for 
the peaceful government and development of the country. lll!ere could not be two 
husbands of one wife; and thereforev1, he declared, "I have done the truest act 
of kindness for you in dividing the land." (86) The Swazi mamelled at Ynis sort 
of reasoning: surely it was a very strange kind of justice that gave an equal 
weight to the claims of both the first and only legitimate llhusband" of a "fair 
maiden" and those of a furtive llloverll, and actually reward the "lover" for his 
successful bid to steal another man's llwife", puni.shhg the "husband" for having 
been made a cuckold! 
ITo wonder the Swazi found the partition stuck in their throats. They 
were bitterly disappointed that the Hi& Commissioner had failed to exercise his 
autocratic power to dismiss all the white concessionaires' claims to land and 
cancel all land concessions, thus leaving all Swazi land to the Swazi nation to 
occupy as a purely native territory on the precedent of Basutoland. The Chiefs 
refused to have anything to do with land apportionment policy and they put the 
responsibility for it all on the shoulders of the hperial government's agent, 
Lord Selborne. Prince Nalunge spoke for many when he said to Lord Selborne on 
15 1.Iay 1909: "The Land has been divided. We have no power to stop the 
Government or to say do not do this; but all I say now is that the partition is 
now finished, it is done. The Government know that we did not like this 
partition ... We have no power, and we cannot feel justified in thanking your 
Lordship for what has been done because the boy [~obhuza 111 is young yet. When 
he gmws up he may think different and blame us for all that is done, so that 
with reference to that question we leave the whole question in the hands of 
your Lordship, and we wash our hands of the whole question." (87) With this 
the Swazi came to accept the partition as final, but the injustice of the whole 
apportionment policy had created an undying feeling of bitterness and suspicion 
against all white people. Sir Alan Pim noted this in his Report on the Financial 
and Economic Situation of Swaziland in 1932, when he wrote: "The partition 
following on the unsavoury history of the concessions - a chapter closed by the 
Privy Council decision of 1926 . . . - affected native interests prejudicially in 
more than one respect. One heritage from this period will long remain a factor 
of importance in any endeavour to raise the standards of native life - the 
distrust of the European, which has for its origin the character of the original 
transactions finally confirmed by the partition. The Swazi believes that his 
Chiefs neither could nor ever intended to transfer the ownership of the land. 
The confirmation of the concessions conflicts with this belief and, as a result, 
he still tends and probably will long continue to tend to regmd any proposal, 
even one for his own improvement, with suspicion, and to seek for some ulterior 
motive." (88) 
The Swazist political submission to imperial Britain had cost them two- 
thirds of their land, and the question to be answered now is why, in the face of 
such provocation, the Swazi, rather than resort to armed confrontation to redress 
their wrongs, chose political collaboration. Nilitary resistance might perhaps 
have forced the British authorities to give up the policy of land apportionment 
and to expropriate forcibly all concessions and physically clear the land of all 
concessionaires. But, in view of the circumstances then prevailing, such 
military resistance as the Swazi might have offered would have been a f'utile 
thougjh dramatic attempt to strike a blow for independence and die. Such an 
attempt would have doomed the nation to extinction, since it is almost certain 
that in the event of an uprising Swaziland would have been m h e d  by the white 
South Africans, especially the Boers of the eastern Transvaal,who either owned 
land themselves in Swaziland as absentee landlords or had close relatives with 
land interests in Swaziland. And when it is remembered how co-operative white 
South Africa had been in the brutal suppression of the native disturbances in 
Natal and Zululand (in 1906), and given further the fact that the fnperial 
authoritiest main objective was to found a thriving white colony in Swaziland 
and have the country incorporated into the Transvaal in the larger Union of 
South Africa, the future for Swaziland would have been very bleak indeed. The 
imperial government had shown no determined objection to using imperial troops 
in quelling the Bambalhuprising in Natal and Zululand; some of the troops were 
still in South Africa, and it is not irresponsible to speculate that the Imperial 
Government would not have hesitated to use them against the Swazi if an uprising l 
occurred. But over and above all these considerations, and most importantly in I 
my view, the reason why the Swazi eschewed dramatic military confrontation and 
adopted political collaboration is to be found in the fact that such military 1 
confrontation was alien to the Swazi - they had no precedent for such black and I 
white confrontation as had characterized the tragic history of the Xhusa,the Zulu, I 
the Basuto (up to 1881) and the Ndebele. Theirs was a proud historical tradition 
of lack of armed conflict with either the Boers or the British. In fact, they 
took special pride in the fact that they had sent contingents to the white 
people's campaigns against the Redi of Chief Sekukuni in 1876 and against their 
mortal enemy, the Zulu of King Cetshwayo, in the Amlo-Zulu Infar of 1879. They 
summed up their relations with the white man in the following words: "Sobhuza [I] 
never killed a white m, nor a white man's sheep, nor a white man's Kafir. 
Uhwazi never killed a white man, nor his sheep, nor his Kafir. Ludonga the same 
and Urnbandine the same." ( 8 9 )  Moreover, they did not see much value in 
discarding the well tried policy of peaceful co-existence now, even though they 
were being subjected to severe pressures. It is not uncharitable to the Swazi to 
say that, alth- they made an impressive show of militarism, Swaziland was not 
a militarist state like the Zulu State, or the Ndebele State, whose prime 
raison d'Qtre was warfstring - and, considering what happened to the Zulu and 
Ndebele, it was a fact of peat historical and political importance that Swazi 
tlmilitarismtl a ways remained an impressive shadow and never became a substantive 
reality. The Reverend Mr Jacksoa was speaking the substantial truth when he 
wrote, in a crudely pungent and unkind characterization of the Swazi: "They are 
warlike and brave when led by white men, but in domestic life they are lazy and 
cowardly, as well as filthy ... Had the the power they would be as insolent and 
oppressive as ever the Zulus were.@l (907 
The failure of the S m i  [through the deputation] to induce the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and the King to redress Swazi grievances and 
to reverse the land apportionment policies of Lord Selborne and Resident 
Codssioner tli.Isindazwew (~oryndon) should not make us blind to the fact that the 
Swazi Chiefs had made themselves felt. It is important to remember that the 
Svwi never really challenged Britain's hnperial claim over them and their land, 
although in using the "independence of the Swazi" argument they gave that 
impression. This was done precisely to highlight their case and not with a view 
to cutting themselves loose from the "noose" and llshacklestt of British imperialism 
and colonialism. What the Swazi leaders were fighting for was the forging of a 
political partnership in W c h  they would concede the role of "senior partner" to 
the British Administration but reserve to themselves as the l1 junior partnert1 
the right to scrutinize critically and possibly to veto the more objectionable 
policies of the "senior partner". This, I t l a ,  is the proper and legitinate 
construction to be put on ~ ~ i c k ~ s  cryptically accurate statement when he wrote 
to the Colonial Office that "They [i.e. the Swazi chiefs] are ready and anxious 
to take all the benefits of protection, but are slow to give ay.thing in 
return". (91) The desire to be left alone to manage their own internal affairs 
while the iizperial government kept a watchful and benevolent eye and dealt with 
foreign powers, especially the Boers and the Portuguese, and dealt with all 
European land grabbers and swindlers (preferably by physically removing them from 
Swaziland or by making life well nigh impossible for them, as in ~asutoland) - 
this was the greatest wish of the Swazi leaders, not their nominal "sovereign 
independencetf, altho- the latter vras a useful device for the forging of the 
delicate balance of the politics of collaboration. Ikmrick was certainly right 
when he wmte to W. T. Stead apropos of the "independence of the Swazi Nationt1: 
ttYou bow as well as I do what the 'independence! of a country like Swaziland, 
situated where it is, would mean, and we have a sufficient object-lesson in the 
results of Urnbandine's lindependencel which are at the bottom of all the trouble 
to--.lt (92) The Swazisr only chance was the "paternal governmenttt of the Ii igh 
Camnissioner and his subordinates in Swaziland. The only other practical 
alternstive to that form of government was annexation to the Transvaal - an 
alternative that the Swazi themselves found so odiously unpleasant as not to merit 
serious consideration. (93) Thus considerations of national survival and a real 
fear of dismemberment at the hands of the ever land-hungry Boer farmers and other 
disreputable land speculators weighed heavily with the Swazi in their adoption of 
the policy of collaboration, and once they had accepted the situation they tried 
to draw as much advantage fmm the bargain as was reasonably possible without 
impair- the partnership with the Imperial administration. The Swazi leaders, 
by their skilful maniyulation of the cards in the game of political collaboration, 
ensconced themselves in a position of power from which the Imperial Governnent 
could not remove them without causing much political upheaval in the country. 
Collaborators are very embarrassing political colleagues since they cannot easily 
be abandoned or dragooned into submission or abject acceptance of undesirable 
policies; and, because of their initial "good behaviour", the Swazi leaders - 
i.e. the Chiefs - came to occupy a position of power with the circle described 
by the Imperial authorities, which waa very much akin to the possession of the 
powers of political veto. For instance, in 1938, when the Administration wanted 
to refonn the chieftainship system and introduce thoroughgoing political refoxms, 
the Chiefs, aware of their enormous power (and aware also of the fact that the 
Administration was trying as it were to "fix" the cazds of political collaboration 
in their favour and against the chiefs) simply blocked the measure and continued 
to stall until 1945, when a much watered down version of the 1938 refonns was 
introduced, with negligible results. This, I believe, is the essence of the 
politics of collaboration the Swazi had embraced: by the politics of collaboration 
the Swazi successfully defied the Imperial Governmentls attempts to reform the 
Swazi political system and to treat the Chiefs as political robots. 
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